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Abstract
The recent renaissance of the Senegalese cooperative movement coupled with
the revival of the agricultural sector motivated this study, which mainly aims
to analyse the impact of farmer-based organization membership on household
land productivity and net income. We combined the Propensity Score Match-
ing (PSM) method with an Endogenous Switching Regression (ESR) model to
derive treatment effects of membership in these farmer organizations using a na-
tional household-level survey data. Results exhibit consistency across estimations
techniques. Estimates of both ESR and PSM models showed that membership
in farmer organizations affects positively and significantly the household land
productivity and net income. Moreover, findings show that membership has a
heterogeneous impact. Households with the lowest probability to be member of
farmer organizations have the highest impact. The effect of membership depends
also on the specific type of organization.
Keywords: Farmer organizations, impact evaluation, land productivity, household
income, Senegal.
JEL classification: Q13, D04, Q15, Q12.
1 Introduction
Agriculture is the main economic sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, its perfor-
mances are challenged by many factors mainly the access to production inputs and
technologies (World Bank, 2007). For decades, policymakers regarded collective ac-
tion groups, such as farmers-based organizations or agricultural cooperatives, as im-
portant tools to address these challenges and improve agricultural performance (Sal-
ifu et al., 2010). According to Schwettmann (2014), Sub-Saharan Africa cooperatives
experienced several stages of development from the colonial era to post-structural
adjustment programs or contemporaneous era. The contemporary cooperatives are
less structured and economically less powerful compared to their predecessors, how-
ever, they are more diverse, more efficient and better adapted to local circumstances
(Schwettmann, 2014).
The development approach based on farmers’ collective action groups still pre-
vails in many developing countries. For example, the Agricultural Services and
Producer Organizations Projects implemented by the World Bank in Chad, Mali,
and Senegal during the period 2000-2011, were mainly based on the development
of farmer organizations, with the expectation that these farmer groups could in-
fluence and improve agricultural development and performances in these countries.
Fortunately, nowadays, such an approach is increasingly supported by quantitative
studies, in which scholars try to estimate the effective contribution of agricultural co-
operatives membership to various agricultural indicators (technology adoption, com-
mercialization, and marketing processes, farm performances, farmer welfare, etc.).
The literature on these studies in developing countries reveals that several fac-
tors are associated with the membership in farmer-based organizations, such as
gender and age of farmers, assets possessed or wealth level (Bernard and Spielman,
2009; Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Mojo et al., 2017), ac-
cess to various rural institutions such as extension, credits and even cooperatives
(Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Mojo et al., 2017), off-farm activities, leadership, farming
experience, geographic location (Abebaw and Haile, 2013), family size and social
networks that farmers belong to, and education level (Mojo et al., 2017). Mean-
while, membership in a cooperative or farmer organizations mostly affects positively
and significantly the prices received by farmers (Wollni and Zeller, 2007; Bernard
et al., 2008; Bernard and Spielman, 2009), commercialization rates (Barham and
Chitemi, 2009; Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Francesconi and Heerink, 2010; Fischer
and Qaim, 2012; Chagwiza et al., 2016), technologies adoption (Abebaw and Haile,
2013; Ma et al., 2018), households welfare (Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Ito et al., 2012;
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Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2015; Ma and Abdulai, 2016; Mojo et al., 2017; Ahmed
and Mesfin, 2017; Mishra et al., 2018).
Despite all these interesting findings, according to the recent study of Mojo
et al. (2017), impact evaluation of the contribution of farmer-based organizations
are still limited. Furthermore, some scholars have found no effect of membership
in farmer-based organizations in their empirical work. Hoken and Su (2015) for in-
stance did not observe any significant difference in received income between members
and non-members of rice-producing cooperatives in suburban China. In addition,
farmer-based organizations performance and impacts may vary across countries and
regions even within the same agricultural sub-sector or across commodities (Bernard
and Taffesse, 2012; Mojo et al., 2017). Moreover, as pointed out by Verhofstadt and
Maertens (2015) studies on cooperative organizations usually focus on a single co-
operative or on multiple cooperatives in a single sub-sector. This study aims to
contribute to this growing literature by taking advantage of an original country-
wide survey data set collected in Senegal to quantify the effect of membership in
farmer-based organizations1 on farmers’ land productivity and household incomes.
The sample data used for the analysis comprises of 4245 farmers located in all six
Senegalese agro-ecological zones. Looking at the effect of the farmers-based organi-
zations at a country level gives a broader perspective of analysis, which is necessary
for policy design.
Moreover, the Senegalese case study is of particular interest for several reasons.
First, as argued by Reed and Hickey (2016), during the last decade, there has been
a renaissance of cooperative movement due to several institutional changes. Second,
since 2012, a sort of revival of the entire Senegalese agriculture is also observed,
noted by the substantial increase of the sector’s contribution to the national GDP
from 12% in 2011 to 16% in 2017 (World Bank, 2017). Finally, in regards to quanti-
tative analysis of the contribution of farmers organizations to agriculture, very little
studies have been carried out in the case of Senegal. The remainder of this paper
is organized as follows. The following sections describe the econometric framework
and the data used. The last sections present, discuss and summarized the results of
the estimations.
1We will use alternatively the expressions farmer organizations, farmer-based organizations
(FBO), producer organizations, or agricultural collective action groups alternatively to define
farmer-based organizations. Farmer organizations in our study include therefore all forms of orga-





Generally, a farmer decides to become a member of a farmer organization for the
services provided by such a collective action group regarding access to credit, farm
inputs, technologies, information, or marketing facilities. Therefore, a assumed
rational farmer would choose to be a member of farmer organization if the ex-
pected utility from this organization membership (M1) is greater than that from
non-membership (M0) . This utility gain from membership in a farmer-based orga-
nization (M∗ = M1 −M0) can be expressed as a function of an observable vector of
covariates (Z) in a latent model as follows:
M∗i = αZi + ηi, Mi = 1 if M
∗
i > 0, (1)
where Mi is a binary variable that equals 1 if household i is a member of a farmer
organization and zero otherwise; α is a vector of parameters to be estimated and Zi
is a vector of household demographics, socio-economic, and farm-level characteris-
tics; and ηi is a random error term assumed to be normally distributed. Membership
in a farmer organization is expected to affect various outcome variables at the farm
or household level including land productivity and household income. Assuming
that the outcome variable (land productivity or household income) is a linear func-
tion of a vector of exogenous variables Xi and endogenous membership in farmers
organization Mi such that:
Yi = βXi + δMi + εi, (2)
where Yi represents the outcome variables (land productivity and agricultural in-
come); Mi is defined as previously; β and δ are parameters to be estimated, and εi is
the error term. However, farmers may self-select into FBOs, rather than being ran-
domly selected. Therefore, estimating equation 2 using ordinary least square (OLS)
might produce biased estimates. We explored then the propensity score matching
and endogenous switching regression models to produce unbiased and consistent
estimates. The PSM controls for selection bias through controlling for observable
confounding factors. However, an important shortcoming of the PSM method is its
inability to deal with biases resulting from unobservable characteristics of sampled
units. The endogenous switching regression addresses the endogeneity of mem-
bership in farmers’ organizations by accounting for both observed and unobserved
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sources of bias (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). Both are used to analyse the consistency
of the obtained results across the estimation techniques
2.2 Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
The propensity score matching method (PSM) is a quasi-experimental technique
often used in observational causal studies. PSM uses observable characteristics of
observation units in the sample to generate a control group that is comparable to
the treated group conditional on identified exogenous factors, but different regarding
the intervention status, here membership in farmers organization (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983). PSM works under two main assumptions. The first is the conditional
independence or unconfoundedness, stating that observable characteristics must be
independent of potential outcomes, which implies that the membership decision is
only based on observable characteristics of households. The second is the common
support condition that needs to be satisfied, i.e. the distributions of observable
characteristics between members of farmer organizations and non-members have to
overlap (Jelliffe et al., 2018). Empirically, in a first step, we regressed the member-
ship of farmers organizations on a vector of observable variables Z (as in equation
1) to generate the propensity scores using a probit estimation (Hirano et al., 2003).
The estimated propensity scores (PSi = Prob (Mi = 1 | Zi)) represent the probabil-
ity of a farmer to belong to a farmer-based organization, and the marginal effects
express the impact of variables in Z on this probability. We included in Z a large
set of conditioning factors in order to minimize omitted variables bias. Secondly, the
generated propensity scores (PS) are used to match farmers who are members of
FBOs to non-members. Numerous algorithms can be applied to match members and
non-members of similar propensity scores. Furthermore, PSM methods are sensi-
tive to a particular specification and matching method (Imbens, 2004; Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2008). Therefore, we use three different common matching techniques:
the nearest neighbor matching, the kernel matching, and the radius matching. The
nearest neighbor matching (NNM) algorithm was implemented with a caliper of 0.01.
In a third step, we examined the extent of overall covariates balancing property and
the overlap over the common support. The fourth step consisted of calculating
the Average treatment on treated ATT , which is the mean difference between the
two matched groups (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Imbens, 2004). Specifically, the
estimated ATT is:
ATT (Z) = E [Y1 |M = 1,Prob (Z)]− E [Y0 |M = 1,Prob (Z)] , (3)
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where, Y1 represents the outcome indicator of the members of farmers organizations,
Y0 is the outcome indicator of non-members; M is defined as previously. Finally,
we checked the robustness of our estimates by using the Rosenbaum (2002) bound-
ing approach. The main assumption behind matching is selection on observables.
However, if there are unobserved variables that affect both membership and the
outcome variable, a hidden bias might arise and affect the estimates of matching
estimators (Rosenbaum, 2002). In particular, the hidden bias could lead to both
positive and negative unobserved selection. Rosenbaum’s method is based on the
sensitivity parameter Γ that measures the degree of departure from random assign-
ment of treatment. Two households with the same observed characteristics may
differ in the odds of belonging to farmers organizations by at most a factor of Γ.
Considering the upper bounds, the factors Γ are incrementally computed until the
threshold of 10% of p-values is reached. The relatively higher is the Γ factor; the
more robust is our model regarding hidden bias due to unobserved confounders.
This sensitivity analysis is based on the Wilcoxon sign rank test. PSM analyses
were conducted using STATA 14. Although we conducted these robustness checks,
PSM only controls for selection biases from observed characteristics. We then ap-
plied an Endogenous switching regression analysis that has the potential to mitigate
biases from both observable and unobservable factors.
2.3 Endogenous Switching Regression (ESR)
Under the Endogenous Switching Regression (ESR) framework, the impact of mem-
bership in farmer organizations on land productivity (and household income) is
estimated in two stages: the first stage concerns the decision to join agricultural col-
lective action groups (equation 1), and the second stage consists in the estimation of
two regimes outcomes equations: one for members and another one for non-members
(equations 4 and 5) represented as follows:
Regime 1 : Y1i = β1X i + ε1i if Mi = 1 (Members) (4)
Regime 2 : Y2i = β2X i + ε2i if Mi = 0 (Non−Members), (5)
where Y1 and Y2 represent the outcome respectively for farmer organization members
(regime 1) and non-members (regime 2); Xi represents the vector of covariates of
farmer i; β1 and β2 are parameters to be estimated; and ε1i and ε2i are errors terms
associated with the outcomes variables. In the ESR framework, the error terms in
the three equations (1, 5 and 4) are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution,
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with zero mean and covariance matrix of the following form:

















the variances of the error terms in the outcome equations (5 and 4); σ1η and σ2η are
the covariances of η, ε1i and ε2i. Covariance between ε1i and ε2i is not defined since
Y1 and Y2 are not observed simultaneously (Maddala et al., 1986). The expected
values of ε1i and ε2i conditional on the sample selection are non-zero, because the
error term of equation 1 is correlated with the error terms of the outcome equations
5 and 4:








where φ(.) is the standard normal probability density function; Φ(.) is the standard
normal cumulative density function; and λ1i and λ2i are the inverse Mills Ratios





(1−Φ(Ziα)) , and in-
cluded in equations 4 and 5 to correct for selection biases resulting from unobservable
factors. Therefore, we have:
Y1i = β1X i + σ1ηλ1i + δ1i if Mi = 1 (Members) (9)
Y2i = β2X i + σ2ηλ2i + δ2i if Mi = 0 (Non−Members), (10)
where δ1i and δ2i are error terms with conditional zero means. The full informa-
tion maximum likelihood (FIML) method was applied to have consistent estimates
(Greene, 2000; Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). Furthermore, appropriate identification
of ESR requires at least one variable in Z that does not appear in X. This vari-
able represents the exclusion restriction necessary to fully estimate the model. The
estimation of the selection equation (1) thus includes two potential instruments. A
valid instrument is required to influence the farmer’s choice of membership but does
not have any direct effect on the outcomes of interest. The first potential instrument
that we use is whether farmers receive information on sales. Thus, from the question
”do you receive information on sales”, we created a dummy variable ”Information
on sales” which takes a value of 1, if the farmer receives information on sales and the
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value 0, otherwise. This instrument is supposed to correlate significantly with the
membership in FBOs. Those farmers who receive information on sales have a higher
probability to belong to farmer organizations. Farmers could join these organiza-
tions with the motivation to be more informed on sales and the associated better
prices. However, receiving this information is not supposed to directly affect the
outcome variables of interest since only receiving information does not directly im-
prove or decreases the land productivity nor total household incomes (but indirectly
affects both outcomes through membership in the organization). The second poten-
tial instrument is the main type of water source used by the household. Similarly
to the first instrument, from the question: ”what is your main source of drinking
water ?”, we created a dummy variable ”water source” that takes the value of 1, if
the household uses tap water and the value of 0, otherwise. The use of tap water
is an asset variable that expresses the capacity of the household to be a member of
farmer organizations, the capacity to afford membership fees.
To check for the validity of these instruments, we ran a probit model for the
equation 1 and OLS regressions for outcome equations (4 and 5) separately and
checked in which equation these variables are effectively significant. The results are
presented in appendix table 11. The positive coefficients of variable ”Information
on sales” and ”Source of water” confirms the expectation that households who have
access to information on sales and use tap water are more likely to be members of
farmer organizations. The designed instruments significantly influence the member-
ship in FBOs but not the non-members farmers’ land productivity (F = 0.084 (2),
p-value = 0.920) and household net income (F = 0.838 (2), p-value = 0.433).
From the assumptions on the distribution of the error terms (6), the derived
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the correlation coefficients between the error term ηi of the selection equation (1)
and respectively the error terms ε1i and ε2i of the outcome equations (4 and 5). If
one of the estimates of correlation coefficients ρ1 or ρ2 is statistically significant, this
would indicate the existence of a selectivity bias due unobserved factors (Abdulai
and Huffman, 2014). Then, the endogenous switching regression model would be
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appropriate. When ρ1 > 0, this implies a negative selection bias, indicating that
farmers who have below than average outcomes are more likely to choose to be
members of farmer organizations, whereas with σ1ν < 0, this would suggest a positive
selection bias. Moreover, if ρ1 or ρ2 have alternate signs, then farmers choose to be
members of producer organizations based on their comparative advantage: members
have above-average outcomes from membership status and the non-members have
above-average outcomes from being non-members. If these correlation coefficients
have the same sign, it would mean a hierarchical sorting: members have above-
average outcomes whether they are members or not, but they are better off being
members, while non-members have below-average outcomes in either case, but they
are better off not being members. The coefficients from the ESR model allow one to
derive the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT ). Specifically, the observed
and unobserved counterfactual outcomes for farmer organization members can be
computed as:
E [Y1i |M = 1] = β1Xi + σ1ηλ1i (13)
E [Y2i |M = 0] = β2Xi + σ2ηλ2i (14)
E [Y2i |M = 1] = β2Xi + σ2ηλ1i (15)
E [Y1i |M = 0] = β1Xi + σ1ηλ2i . (16)
Equation 13 computes the observed outcome (a) for organization members and equa-
tion 14 calculates the observed outcome (b) for non-members. The expected outcome
(c) in equation 15 represents the counterfactual for the observed outcome (a) in equa-
tion 13. This counterfactual expresses what would have happened had the farmers
decided to be member of the organizations. Similarly the equation 16 is a coun-
terfactual outcome (d) for the observed outcome (b) in equation 14. It represents
the scenario in which farmers decided to be members of producers organizations.
Using these expected outcomes (equations 13 to 16) we derive unbiased treatment
effects: the average treatment effect on treat (ATT , which is the difference between
equation 13 and 15 that is a − c), and the average treatment effect on untreated
(ATU , which is the difference between equation 16 and 14 that is d− b).
ATT = E [Y1i |M = 1]− E [Y2i |M = 1] = (β1 − β2)Xi + λ1i (σ1ν − σ2ν) (17)
ATU = E [Y1i |M = 0]− E [Y2i |M = 0] = (β1 − β2)Xi + λ2i (σ1ν − σ2ν) . (18)
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2.4 Addressing other empirical issues
For the empirical specification of the first stage of the ESR model (estimation of the
selection equation), several factors are associated with membership in producer or-
ganizations. These factors which include personal details of household head (gender,
age, education), household characteristics (e.g. household size, agricultural assets,
land size), access to agricultural extension services, and the geographic location of
the household. It is worth noting however, that households could have better ac-
cess to extension due to their membership in collective action groups, rendering the
access to extension services variable potentially endogenous in the modeling of the
choice to farmers organizations and leading then to biased estimates. We, therefore,
corrected this endogeneity issue with the two-stage control function approach sug-
gested by Wooldridge (2015). In a first stage, we estimated separately, the access
to extension services and the membership in organizations on the same indepen-
dent variables plus an instrument, here the farmer’s expressed needs of extension
services, using a probit model. The instrument, ”need of extension”2, significantly
influences the access to extension services (χ2 (1) = 3.613, p-value = 0.057) but not
directly the household decision to belong to organizations (χ2 (1) = 0.647, p-value
= 0.421, see table 9 in the appendix). In the second-stage probit estimation, the ac-
cess to extension services variable and their generalized residuals predicted from the
first-stage are included in the selection equation. Moreover, this variable ”extension
needs” is not correlated to the other instruments used in the rest of the analysis,
such as information on sales (Pearson’s correlation = 0.011, t = 0.741 (4243), p-
value = 0.459) or the use of tap water for drinking (Pearson’s correlation = −0.005,
t = −0.353 (4243), p-value = 0.724 )
2.5 Heterogeneous treatment effects analysis
Following (Abebaw and Haile, 2013) and (Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2015), we
analyse how the estimated outcome effects of organizations membership vary within
members. Therefore, we used the estimates of ATT as a dependent variable and
run ordinary least squares (OLS) to regress it on farm household characteristics. In
addition, we plotted OLS regressions of estimated ATT on the propensity score, and
2From the two questions: ”do you need extension services?” and ”what do you need extension
services for?”, we created a dummy variable ”extension needs” which takes the value 1, if the
household responds ”yes” to the first question and states technology diffusion services in the second
question and the value 0, otherwise. Farmers who expressed a need for technologies in their
activities are expected to have access to extension services, or at least exploring ways to have
access to it.
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on some farm characteristics (i.e. age, education, gender, size of the household, and
distance to nearest road) to derive smoothed curves. Such graphical and statistical
analyses help to find out which type of households the impact of membership in
farmer organizations is the most important.
3 Data sources and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data sources
The data used for the analysis derived from a survey conducted in Senegal, which
randomly sampled 4480 households that mainly produce dry cereals (or rainfed ce-
reals). The survey was done under the Agricultural Policy Support Project (Projet
d’Appui aux Politiques Agricoles, PAPA)3, which is an initiative of the Government
of Senegal funded by USAID-Senegal as part of the ”Feed The Future” initiative,
and implemented for a period of 3 years (2015 - 2018) by the Senegalese Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Facilities with technical support from the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). A multistage sampling procedure was applied
for the selection of households and a structured household questionnaire was used
to collect information. This questionnaire included several modules and gathered
information on a range of topics such as household demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics, farmer organization membership, household assets, crop production,
livestock revenues, income and expenditures, access to infrastructure, access to insti-
tutions, commercialization, and production shocks and risk management strategies.
Besides information on crop production and inputs used, data collection also in-
cluded market prices and households’ adoption of agricultural technologies during
the main agricultural season of 2016/2017. After data cleaning and removing ob-
servations with no information on the different outcome variables, a final sample of
4245 households was used for the analysis. This sample includes farmers located in
all six Senegalese agro-ecological zones.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the definition and summary statistics of the variables used in the
analysis. It also reports the comparative descriptive statistics of these variables
based on farmer organization membership status. Following the definition of Bernard
3Official website of the project is http://www.papa.gouv.sn/.
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et al. (2015), our variable of interest ”organization membership” is referred to as
membership in a rural producer organization that provides farmers with farming and
farm-related services including access to inputs, markets and credits, collective sales,
and capacities reinforcement. Eight types of farmers organizations were mentioned
by the surveyed households: Producer Groups, Economic Interest Groups, Rural
Associations, Cooperatives, Women Producers Groups, Federations, Unions, and
Networks. Therefore, the variable ”organization membership” is binary, coded as 1
if a member of the household belongs to any of this farmers-based organization, and
0 otherwise. In some households, several family members expressed their belonging
to these organizations, with a maximum of 7 members. However, on average only
one family member belongs to a group. About 9% of the households in the sample
have at least one person belonging to a group. The main organizations, which gather
most of the household family members, are Economic Interest Groups (44.1%), Rural
Associations (16.7%), Producer Groups (16.1%), and Cooperatives (15.3%).
Regarding the outcome variables, land productivity is measured as the net value
in FCFA4 of all crop outputs valued at the market prices per unit of land area.
This approach is more suitable since most cereals productions are not marketed
by farmers. The net value of all crop production represents the value of all crop
production after the deduction of all crop production costs, such as seeds cost,
fertilizer costs, all other costs, and hired labour. Farmers in the sample have on
average a land productivity of 130,050 FCFA per hectare. The household income
was generated by adding to the net value of all crop production, the livestock income
received by the farmer during the last 12 months, and all off-farm incomes 5. On
average, the sampled households receive 592,100 FCFA as net total income. The
two outcomes variables are log specified.
41 FCFA=0.0017 USD as at December 2019.
5Crafts, hunting, forestry, fishing, small business, farm products processing, transport
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Table 1: Description of variables
Variables Description and measurement Pooled Members Non-Members P-values
(1) (3) (2) (4)
Organization Membership Membership in farmer organizations (1=yes, 0=no) 0.088 (0.28)
Outcome variables
Land Productivity All crop production per hectare (1000 FCFA/ha) 130.05 (301.62) 255.75 (631.57) 117.97 (244.60) <0.01
Household income Total net household income (1000 FCFA) 592.10 (878.51) 844.09 (1299.84) 567.90 (823.01) <0.01
Household and Head characteristics
Gender Household head is a male (1=yes, 0=no) 0.93 (0.25) 0.95 (0.22) 0.93 (0.25) 0.14
Age Age of household head (years) 53.07 (13.44) 51.09 (12.13) 53.27 (13.55) <0.01
Education Formal education (1=yes, 0=no) 0.37 (0.48) 0.51 (0.50) 0.36 (0.48) <0.01
Active members Active family members 5.72 (3.15) 6.37 (3.43) 5.66 (3.12) <0.01
Dependents Non-active family members 4.28 (3.31) 5.01 (3.82) 4.21 (3.25) <0.01
Migration Household head is a migrant (1=yes, 0=no) 0.14 (0.35) 0.15 (0.36) 0.14 (0.35) 0.51
Household Assets
Equipment Agricultural Equipment (1.000.000 FCFA) 0.13 (0.56) 0.17 (0.46) 0.13 (0.57) 0.08
Area Owned Land size owned by household (ha) 5.82 (8.37) 5.62 (6.24) 5.84 (8.54) 0.52
Access to infrastructures
Distance to road Distance to nearest all-weather road (km) 10.15 (14.15) 10.32 (13.90) 10.14 (14.18) 0.81
Extension Access to extension services (1=yes, 0=no) 0.11 (0.31) 0.42 (0.49) 0.08 (0.27) <0.01
Agro-ecological zones
Groundnut AEZ Groundnut agro-ecological zone (1=yes, 0=no) 0.50 (0.50) 0.28 (0.45) 0.52 (0.50) <0.01
Casamance AEZ Casamance agro-ecological zone (1=yes, 0=no) 0.25 (0.43) 0.31 (0.46) 0.25 (0.43) 0.01
South-East AEZ South East agro-ecological zone (1=yes, 0=no) 0.11 (0.31) 0.15 (0.36) 0.11 (0.31) 0.02
Other AEZ Other agro-ecological zones (1=yes, 0=no) 0.14 (0.35) 0.25 (0.44) 0.13 (0.34) <0.01
Instrumental Variables
Information on Sales Information on Sales (1=yes, 0=no) 0.01 (0.11) 0.05 (0.22) 0.01 (0.10) <0.01
Tap water Use of tap water for drinking (1=yes, 0=no) 0.35 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.65
Extension needs Express need for technologies (1=yes, 0=no) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.07) 0.01 (0.09) 0.37
N Number of Observations 4245 372 3873 4245
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis
12
Following the literature on land productivity and agricultural household incomes,
we have included in the models, several control variables, such as household and its
heads characteristics (gender, age, education, active household size, dependents6,
and migration status7), the household assets (the total value of possessed agricul-
tural equipment and the land area owned), household access to rural institutions
(extension services, distance to the nearest road), and agro-ecological zones dum-
mies. About 93% of the households in the sample are predominantly male-headed.
The sampled households heads are generally old with an average age of 53 years
and without any formal education. Besides farming activities, households also get
revenues from off-farm activities (33.8%). On average, the household includes ten
family members and owns about 130,000 FCFA of agricultural implements and about
5.82 ha of farming land with 4.47 ha dedicated to crop cultivation. More than 85%
of farm households in the sample are located in the Groundnut basin, Casamance
and South East agro-ecological zones.
When comparing members of farmer organizations to non-members, significant
differences in means can be observed for outcome indicators as for most of the control
variables. Members of farmer organizations tend to have larger households (11
persons) than non-members (9 to 10 persons), and they appear averagely to be more
educated. They also have better productivity per hectare and receive higher incomes
than non-members. These significant differences in means between members and
non-members suggest that farmers-based organizations might play an important role
in enhancing farmers’ adoption of technologies and permitting them to have a higher
level of productivity and incomes. However, these results does not permit making
inferences about the effect that membership in farmers organizations might have
on farmers’ incomes. These comparisons of means do not account for confounding
factors such as observed household and farm-level characteristics and unobserved
factors (e.g. perception and motivations of membership choice).
4 Results and discussion
This section reports first the identified factors that drive membership in farmers’
organizations using the probit regression model. Then, it is followed by the results
of the impact of organization membership on land productivity and income using
6Active members are aged between 15 and 65 years and dependents regroup members aged
below 15 years and more than 65 years.
7It is a dummy variable for the migration status of the household head. This variable also serves
as a proxy for involvement in off-farming activities.
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the PSM and ESR models. Finally, the heterogeneous effects are analyzed and
discussed.
4.1 Membership in farmers organizations
Factors that influence households’ decision to belong to farmer organizations are
presented in table 2 with their marginal effects. The likelihood ratio test shows that
the model estimates are significant at 1% level (χ2 = 445.49 (17), p < 0.01). Results
of estimation of equation 1 indicate that membership in farmer organizations is
significantly influenced by the education level of the household head, the household’s
size (number of active persons living in the household and the dependents), distance
of the household to the nearest road, access to information on sales, the existence
of tap water in the household and the location of the household in different agro-
ecological zones (Groundnut basin, Casamance and South-East).
Formal education significantly and positively affects the probability for a house-
hold to be a member of an agricultural collective action group. Households with an
educated head are about 4% more likely to join agricultural collective action groups.
The household family size has also a positive and significant effect on membership in
farmer organizations. These results support those of Bernard and Spielman (2009)
and Ma and Abdulai (2016). For instance, households that have more active per-
sons in the household have a higher probability (0.4%) to be members of producer
organizations. With more active people, households have a better chance that one
of their family members could belong to a farmer-based organization.
Geographic location and agro-climatic conditions of the households also have
significant effects on the decision of farmers to be members or not. Results reveal
that farmers who live closer to all-weather roads are respectively better prone to
participate in groups actions with a 0.1% probability for each additional kilometre.
These results suggest a clustering of farmers’ organization members, due to spatial
non-observable factors such as climate, institutions, and infrastructure. These find-
ings corroborate those of Abebaw and Haile (2013) and Ma and Abdulai (2016).
According to Ma and Abdulai (2016), in China variables representing soil types and
regions have significant cluster effects.
Gender of the household head and the different assets owned by the household
such as the value of agricultural implements and the land area do not appear to
have any significant effect on membership, contradicting with some of the previous
studies by Abebaw and Haile (2013) and Mojo et al. (2017). In addition, access to
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extension services affect positively but not significantly the farmers’ probability to be
members of collective action organizations. However, the effect appears significant
in the ESR regressions. Access to various institutions e.g. agricultural extension
services (Abebaw and Haile, 2013) and credit (Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai, 2018)
and even the access to farmer organizations Mojo et al. (2017) are, in previous
literature associated with membership.
Table 2: Probit Estimation of Membership in Farmers Organizations
Coefficients Marginal Effets
Intercept −1.868 (0.450)∗∗∗
Gender 0.060 (0.133) 0.007 (0.014)
Age 0.024 (0.017) 0.003 (0.002)
Age Squared −0.000 (0.000)∗∗ −0.000 (0.000)∗∗
Education 0.314 (0.078)∗∗∗ 0.040 (0.010)∗∗∗
Active persons 0.033 (0.010)∗∗∗ 0.004 (0.001)∗∗∗
Dependents 0.027 (0.010)∗∗∗ 0.003 (0.001)∗∗∗
Migration 0.042 (0.101) 0.005 (0.013)
Equipment −0.009 (0.050) −0.001 (0.006)
Area owned 0.002 (0.004) 0.000 (0.000)
Distance to road −0.008 (0.003)∗∗∗ −0.001 (0.000)∗∗∗
Extension 0.286 (0.832) 0.040 (0.136)
Groundnut AEZ −0.892 (0.154)∗∗∗ −0.109 (0.020)∗∗∗
Casamance AEZ −0.318 (0.123)∗∗∗ −0.033 (0.011)∗∗∗
South-East AEZ −0.280 (0.118)∗∗ −0.028 (0.010)∗∗∗
Information on Sales 0.801 (0.292)∗∗∗ 0.162 (0.085)∗
Tap water 0.196 (0.076)∗∗∗ 0.024 (0.010)∗∗
Extension residuals 0.437 (0.437)
Log Likelihood −1038.128 −1038.128
LR Test 445.49∗∗∗
Num. obs. 4245 4245
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
4.2 Impact of FBO membership: PSM results
This section presents the treatment effects estimated from the PSM models. Based
on the probit estimation of equation 1, propensity scores were obtained for the
matching. The validation of PSM models depends on the quality of the matching.
Table 10 in appendix provides the overall covariate balancing test. Results show that
the standardized mean difference for all covariates used for the matching reduces
from 23.9% before matching to 2.7% after matching. Moreover, the likelihood ratio
test indicates that the null hypothesis of the joint significance of all covariates could
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be rejected before matching p > χ2 = 0.000. Conversely, after the matching, with
the same test the joint significance of all covariates could not be rejected p > χ2 =
0.997. These results indicate that the required balancing property of the distribution
of propensity scores is satisfied. Furthermore, Figure 2 in the appendix shows the
common support between the two groups. Most of farmers organizations members
and non-members had a common support region, only seven members were outside
the common support region and therefore dropped from the matched sample.
Table 3 reports the average treatment effect on the treated from the PSM mod-
els. The robust standard errors of these estimates were calculated by bootstrapping
using 50 replications. As stated previously three matching methods were used: the
nearest neighbor matching, the kernel matching, and the radius matching. The av-
erage treatment effects on the treated for land productivity and household income
are all positive and statically significant. For instance, with the Nearest Neighbour
matching method, the effects of membership are evaluated at 28% for land pro-
ductivity and 14.4% for household income. The estimated values of the effect of
membership of producer organizations are quite close across the alternative match-
ing specifications. From these results, one can conclude that that in the absence of
observable selection bias, membership in a collective action group affects positively
and significantly farmers’ land productivity and household income. Our findings are
similar to those of other studies that empirically reported a significant and positive
relationship between membership in farmer-based organizations and farm produc-
tivity and household welfare, in China (Ma and Abdulai, 2016) and in Rwanda
(Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014).
Table 3: ATT of FBO membership: PSM Estimates
Outcomes
Matching Methods
Nearest Neighbor Kernel Radius
Land Productivity 0.280 (0.072)∗∗∗ 0.323 (0.067)∗∗∗ 0.331 (0.050)∗∗∗
Household Income 0.144 (0.081)∗ 0.182 (0.073)∗∗ 0.183 (0.070)∗∗∗
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
To check the robustness of our PSM model results, as mentioned previously,
we calculated the Rosenbaum bounds (Becker and Caliendo, 2007) and reported in
table 4 the upper bounds results with their p-values. The Rosenbaum bounds were
computed for treatment effects that are significantly different from zero. Considering
the significance level of 10%, the lowest value of Γ in all PSM specifications was
1.10 − 1.15 obtained with the nearest neighbour technique and the largest value
was 1.70 − 1.75 observed for a kernel matching. For instance, when considering
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the impact of membership on land productivity (for PSM Nearest Neighbour), the
sensitivity analysis implies that at a level of Γ = 1.50, the causal inference may be
viewed critically. This would mean that if farmers with similar covariates differ in
their odds of being members of farmer-based organizations by a factor of 50%, the
significance of membership effect on land productivity might be questionable. This
value is relatively low. Considering the threshold of 80% for Γ, which is generally
used in social sciences. These results suggest that the positive and significant impact
estimates of organization membership on land productivity and household incomes
are at some levels sensitive to unobservables or hidden-bias. Therefore, we considered
the endogenous switching regression approach that accounts for both observed and
unobserved factors.
Table 4: Rosenbaum Γ bounds sensitivity analysis for hidden bias
Outcomes
Matching Methods
Nearest Neighbor Kernel Radius
Land Productivity 1.45− 1.50 (0.066− 0.109) 1.70− 1.75 (0.089− 0.131) 1.65− 1.70 (0.084− 0.127)
Household Income 1.10− 1.15 (0.055− 0.109) 1.20− 1.25 (0.059− 0.110) 1.20− 1.25 (0.090− 0.157)
Notes: P-values are in parenthesis
4.3 Impact of FBO membership: ESR results
Results from the endogenous switching regression models are presented in tables
5and 6. The ESR models were estimated using the FIML approach which derives
both the selection and outcome equations jointly. The first stages of the estimation
of ESR regressions are presented in columns (1) while the second stage of the es-
timation, i.e. estimation of separate outcome equations for organizations members
and non-members, are reported in columns (2) and (3).
Except for the variables access to extension services and information on sales, the
estimation results of the selection equation are similar, in terms of signs and signifi-
cance, to the estimation of the probit estimation of equation 1 discussed previously.
The exclusion restriction variable, access to information on sales, is statistically sig-
nificant only for the household income model. Meanwhile, the second stage of the
FIML shows that the estimated coefficients of the correlation ρ between farmer or-
ganizations membership and both land productivity and household income are all
negative, but statistically significant only for members, implying that the hypoth-
esis of absence of sample selectivity bias, in both models may be rejected. These
findings suggest that both observed and unobserved factors influence the decision to
belong to farmers organization and both land productivity and household income
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given the membership. Moreover, ρ1 (members correlation coefficients) in both out-
come models have a negative sign, indicating a positive selection bias and implying
that households with above average land productivity and household income are
more likely to belong to farmer-based organizations. Furthermore, ρ1 and ρ2 have
the same sign, suggesting that members have above-average land productivity and
household income whether they are members or not, but they are better off being
members, while non-members have below-average outcomes in either case, but they
are better off not being members.
Table 5: ESR Regression of Land Productivity
Selection Equation Members Non-Members
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept −1.808 (0.441)∗∗∗ 15.829 (0.894)∗∗∗ 11.035 (0.213)∗∗∗
Gender 0.037 (0.131) −0.027 (0.242) 0.090 (0.060)
Age 0.017 (0.016) −0.049 (0.028)∗ −0.002 (0.007)
Age Squared −0.000 (0.000)∗ 0.001 (0.000)∗∗ 0.000 (0.000)
Education 0.245 (0.073)∗∗∗ −0.364 (0.120)∗∗∗ 0.120 (0.033)∗∗∗
Active persons 0.034 (0.010)∗∗∗ −0.004 (0.020) 0.016 (0.006)∗∗∗
Dependents 0.029 (0.010)∗∗∗ −0.036 (0.018)∗∗ −0.003 (0.005)
Migration −0.023 (0.096) −0.130 (0.153) −0.063 (0.044)
Equipment −0.042 (0.052) 0.173 (0.131) 0.079 (0.027)∗∗∗
Area owned 0.001 (0.004) −0.019 (0.010)∗ −0.007 (0.002)∗∗∗
Distance to road −0.007 (0.003)∗∗∗ −0.004 (0.005) −0.004 (0.001)∗∗∗
Extension 1.399 (0.702)∗∗ −0.712 (0.207)∗∗∗ 0.250 (0.066)∗∗∗
Groundnut AEZ −0.762 (0.140)∗∗∗ −0.597 (0.203)∗∗∗ −0.232 (0.056)∗∗∗
Casamance AEZ −0.255 (0.116)∗∗ −0.764 (0.177)∗∗∗ 0.361 (0.056)∗∗∗
South-East AEZ −0.283 (0.118)∗∗ −1.008 (0.208)∗∗∗ 0.358 (0.068)∗∗∗
Information on Sales 0.287 (0.254)
Tap water 0.180 (0.066)∗∗∗








Num. obs. 4245 372 3873
Note:∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses
Outcomes equations from the ESR regressions show that members land produc-
tivity is significantly determined by the age, education, number of dependents, area
of land owned, access to extension, and the household agro-ecological zone (Ground-
nut basin, Casamance and South East). For non-members, the main variables that
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Table 6: ESR Regression of Household Income
Selection Equation Members Non-Members
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept −1.864 (0.444)∗∗∗ 14.675 (0.985)∗∗∗ 11.454 (0.255)∗∗∗
Gender 0.053 (0.132) 0.700 (0.254)∗∗∗ 0.528 (0.072)∗∗∗
Age 0.020 (0.017) −0.039 (0.030) 0.003 (0.009)
Age Squared −0.000 (0.000)∗ 0.000 (0.000) −0.000 (0.000)
Education 0.267 (0.075)∗∗∗ −0.196 (0.132) −0.025 (0.039)
Active persons 0.035 (0.010)∗∗∗ 0.021 (0.021) 0.055 (0.007)∗∗∗
Dependents 0.027 (0.010)∗∗∗ −0.032 (0.019) 0.020 (0.006)∗∗∗
Migration 0.011 (0.098) −0.106 (0.160) −0.100 (0.052)∗
Equipment −0.027 (0.051) 0.315 (0.153)∗∗ 0.135 (0.033)∗∗∗
Area owned 0.003 (0.004) 0.061 (0.011)∗∗∗ 0.037 (0.002)∗∗∗
Distance to road −0.007 (0.003)∗∗∗ −0.007 (0.005) −0.007 (0.001)∗∗∗
Extension 1.001 (0.756) −0.791 (0.243)∗∗∗ 0.248 (0.084)∗∗∗
Groundnut AEZ −0.807 (0.146)∗∗∗ 0.605 (0.228)∗∗∗ 0.013 (0.068)
Casamance AEZ −0.267 (0.119)∗∗ 0.028 (0.188) 0.135 (0.066)∗∗
South-East AEZ −0.278 (0.119)∗∗ 0.140 (0.218) 0.256 (0.081)∗∗∗
Information on Sales 0.581 (0.270)∗∗
Tap water 0.180 (0.070)∗∗








Num. obs. 4245 372 3873
Note:∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses
affect significantly their land productivity are education, number of active family
people, the value of agricultural equipment, area of land owned, distance to the
nearest road, access to extension services, the residence in agro-ecological zones
(Groundnut, Casamance and South East).
Results of the ESR also exhibit some differences in the determinants of house-
hold income for members and non-members. Variables such as gender, the value
of agricultural equipment, land area owned, access to extension services, and the
residence in Casamance agro-ecological zone, affect significantly members household
income. Meanwhile, the household income of non-members is influenced by gen-
der, household size, migration, agricultural equipment, area of land owned, distance
to road, access to extension services, residence in the Casamance and South-East
agro-ecological regions.
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The ESR model produces mean outcomes on treated household and correspond-
ing counterfactual outcomes i.e. what would have been the outcome had the treated
group not received the treatment. The average treatment effect on treated (ATT)
is the net difference between these two outcomes. Similarly, the model also pro-
duces the mean outcome of the control group (non-members) and its counterfactual
i.e. what would have been the mean outcome had the control group received the
treatment. The difference between these last two outcomes produces the average
treatment effect on untreated (ATU). These average outcomes and the estimated
ATT and ATU are presented in table 7. The estimates reveal that the treatment
effect for membership in farmer-based organizations on land productivity and house-
hold income are positive and significantly different from zero. The ATT are 2.405
and 1.959 for land productivity and household income, respectively. Membership
in producer organizations significantly improves the log of land productivity and
household income by 19.3% and 14.1%, respectively. Had non-members decided to
be members of farmer-based organizations, the log of their land productivity would
have been increased by 24.5% and their income by 20%.






14.842 (0.724) 12.438(0.265) ATT = 2.405 (0.769)∗∗∗ 19.3
13.416 (0.588) 10.774(0.260) ATU = 2.643 (0.692)∗∗∗ 24.5
Household Income
15.899 (0.977) 13.940 (0.486) ATT = 1.959 (0.686)∗∗∗ 14.1
14.629 (0.856) 12.194 (0.455) ATU = 2.435 (0.601)∗∗∗ 20.0
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Our results suggest that farmer organizations in Senegal are effective at enhanc-
ing farmers’ land productivity and welfare. These results are in line with those of
Ma and Abdulai (2016) in China, Mishra et al. (2018) in Nepal, and Francesconi
and Ruben (2012) in Ethiopia, who found that members of farmer-based organiza-
tions generally experience better crop yields than non-members. Our findings are
also consistent with the results of the growing literature on farmer-based organiza-
tions in developing countries, where most scholars observed a positive correlation
between membership and economic welfare (Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Verhofstadt
and Maertens, 2015; Wossen et al., 2017).
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4.4 Heterogeneous treatment effects
For the rest of the analysis, we focus on the evaluation of the heterogeneity of the
effect of membership in farmer organizations, using graphical and regressions tech-
niques. Figure 1 shows how the treatment effect on land productivity and household
income (estimated from ESR models) vary over the propensity scores. The results
show that the ATT on both outcomes indicators varies significantly with the propen-
sity score and that the slope is negative, suggesting that the effects of farmers based
organization membership on land productivity and household income are stronger
for households with the lowest probability to belong to a farmers organization and
these effects decrease with the propensity of membership. The slopes coefficients
of the graphs are estimated at 2.3 and 3.4 respectively for land productivity and
household income. This would mean that with every 1 percentage point increase
in the likelihood of membership in farmer organizations, the effect of membership
on land productivity and household income would reduce respectively by 2.3% and
3.4%. The household income effect of membership in farmer organizations even be-
comes zero in the upper end of the propensity score distribution. These results to
some extent are similar to those observed in Rwanda by Verhofstadt and Maertens
(2015). As stated by these authors farmers who would take most from member-
ship in producer organizations are the ones who face entry constraints (human or
physical) and therefore are less keen to become members.
R = - 0.54 , p < 2.2e-16
y = 2.9 - 2.3 x    Radj
















R = - 0.87 , p < 2.2e-16
y = 2.7 - 3.4 x    Radj

















Figure 1: Heterogeneity over propensity scores
The OLS regression of the estimates of ATT, from the ESR models, on some of
the characteristics of organization members are presented in table 8. Results show
that the effect of membership in FBO on farm land productivity and household
income appears to be different for each member. The impact of membership for
both outcomes decreases significantly with the number of active persons living in
the household and this effect is less important for those households who have access
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to extension services. Moreover, the effect has a U-shape relation with the age of
the household head, implying that the effect of membership decreases with age for
younger household heads and increases after a certain age. The impact of member-
ship on land productivity also increases significantly with distance to the nearest
road. Furthermore, this effect is less important for formally educated members.
With regard to the household income, statistically significant differential effects are
observed for other characteristics such as gender and the area of land possessed.
The effect is larger for male members than for female members and it increases with
the area of land possessed. OLS regressions results are at some extent corroborated
by figures (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) in the appendix. Moreover, membership effect appears
to be determined by the specific type of organizations that households belong to.
Results show that the impact of membership on land productivity is stronger for
households who belong to the Economic Interest Groups. Meanwhile, the effect of
membership on household income is more important for households who are mem-
bers of Cooperatives. Furthermore, for both outcomes, this effect is less significant
for households who are members of Rural Associations.
Table 8: Heterogeneous treatment effects:OLS regressions
OLS without types of
Farmer Organizations










Intercept 3.714 (0.382)∗∗∗ 3.122 (0.256)∗∗∗ 3.847 (0.374)∗∗∗ 3.172 (0.251)∗∗∗
Gender 0.021 (0.121) 0.202 (0.081)∗∗ −0.039 (0.119) 0.181 (0.080)∗∗
Age −0.042 (0.014)∗∗∗ −0.041 (0.009)∗∗∗ −0.046 (0.014)∗∗∗ −0.041 (0.009)∗∗∗
Age Squared 0.001 (0.000)∗∗∗ 0.001 (0.000)∗∗∗ 0.001 (0.000)∗∗∗ 0.001 (0.000)∗∗∗
Education −0.476 (0.055)∗∗∗ −0.060 (0.037) −0.457 (0.054)∗∗∗ −0.056 (0.036)
Active members −0.040 (0.009)∗∗∗ −0.060 (0.006)∗∗∗ −0.037 (0.009)∗∗∗ −0.059 (0.006)∗∗∗
Migration −0.101 (0.075) 0.060 (0.050) −0.109 (0.073) 0.055 (0.049)
Equipment −0.008 (0.065) 0.006 (0.044) −0.026 (0.064) 0.008 (0.043)
Area owned −0.008 (0.005) 0.038 (0.003)∗∗∗ −0.007 (0.005) 0.036 (0.003)∗∗∗
Distance to road 0.015 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.001) 0.014 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.001)





0.181 (0.070)∗∗∗ −0.032 (0.047)
Rural Associations −0.208 (0.082)∗∗ −0.162 (0.055)∗∗∗
Producer Groups −0.019 (0.084) 0.034 (0.057)
Cooperatives 0.125 (0.084) 0.157 (0.057)∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.562 0.753 0.589 0.767
Num. obs. 372 372 372 372
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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5 Conclusion
In Senegal, recent renaissance of the cooperative movement coupled with the revival
of the agricultural sector led us to explore the impact of farmer-based organization
membership on cereals producing farm household land productivity and net incomes.
Results were derived using a nationally represented household cross-sectional data
collected in all agro-ecological regions and two econometric estimation techniques
that control for selection bias arising from both observed and unobserved factors.
We find that the education of the household head, household size, distance to the
nearest road, access to extension and to information on sales, living conditions of
the household proxied by water source and the location of the household in various
agro-ecological zones are the most important factors influencing households decision
to belong to a producer organization. Additionally, findings suggest that member-
ship in farmers’ collective action groups is a key component of farm households’ land
productivity and income, and obtained results appear to be consistent throughout
the two estimation methods. In particular, results from our preferred model, the En-
dogenous Switching Regressions, show that being a member of an organization helps
to increase land productivity by almost twenty percent and household income by at
least fourteen percent. Furthermore, membership in farmer organizations exhibits
heterogeneous effects over the propensity score and over household characteristics.
The estimated treatment effects are negatively correlated with households’ likelihood
to belong to a farmer-based organization, implying that the effect of membership is
stronger for households with the lowest propensity to become members, meanwhile
suggesting the possible existence of entry barriers that might face some farmers.
These results support once again the idea that farmer organizations have the
potential to benefit farmers by increasing their incomes through the provision of
conditions and the necessary social networks for access to technologies, knowledge,
and production inputs. These collective action groups would, therefore, induce bet-
ter farm productivity for improved incomes and then contribute to reducing rural
poverty.
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Appendix
Table 9: Addressing potential endogeneity of extension variable
Membership Extension
Intercept −1.809 (0.430)∗∗∗ −1.850 (0.396)∗∗∗
Gender 0.063 (0.125) 0.043 (0.111)
Age 0.027 (0.016)∗ 0.028 (0.014)∗∗
Age Squared −0.000 (0.000)∗∗ −0.000 (0.000)∗
Education 0.307 (0.060)∗∗∗ 0.255 (0.056)∗∗∗
Active members 0.029 (0.010)∗∗∗ −0.004 (0.010)
Dependents 0.024 (0.009)∗∗∗ −0.007 (0.009)
Migration 0.067 (0.081) 0.272 (0.071)∗∗∗
Equipment 0.002 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003)
Area owned −0.002 (0.043) 0.080 (0.037)∗∗
Distance to road −0.007 (0.002)∗∗∗ −0.006 (0.002)∗∗∗
Groundnut AEZ −0.917 (0.091)∗∗∗ −0.656 (0.084)∗∗∗
Casamance AEZ −0.350 (0.094)∗∗∗ −0.360 (0.090)∗∗∗
South-East AEZ −0.288 (0.111)∗∗∗ −0.078 (0.103)
Information on Sales 0.842 (0.182)∗∗∗ 0.892 (0.176)∗∗∗
Tap water 0.212 (0.071)∗∗∗ 0.083 (0.064)
Extension needs −0.305 (0.359) 0.507 (0.238)∗∗
Log Likelihood −1152.478 −1371.070
Num. obs. 4245 4245
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 10: Propensity score matching quality test
Before Matching After Matching
Pseudo R2 0.177 0.005
LR χ2 445.49 5.33
P-value (p > χ2) 0.000 0.997
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Figure 2: Kernel density of propensity scores
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Table 11: Instrumental variable checking for ESR regressions
Membership Land Productivity Household Income
Non-Members Members Non-Members Members
Intercept −1.87 (0.45)∗∗∗ 11.04 (0.21)∗∗∗ 12.88 (0.70)∗∗∗ 11.47 (0.26)∗∗∗ 12.27 (0.76)∗∗∗
Gender 0.06 (0.13) 0.09 (0.06) 0.10 (0.22) 0.53 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.77 (0.24)∗∗∗
Age 0.02 (0.02) −0.00 (0.01) −0.03 (0.03) 0.00 (0.01) −0.02 (0.03)
Age Squared −0.00 (0.00)∗∗ 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Education 0.31 (0.08)∗∗∗ 0.12 (0.03)∗∗∗ −0.12 (0.10) −0.02 (0.04) 0.04 (0.11)
Active members 0.03 (0.01)∗∗∗ 0.02 (0.01)∗∗∗ 0.03 (0.02) 0.06 (0.01)∗∗∗ 0.05 (0.02)∗∗
Dependents 0.03 (0.01)∗∗∗ −0.00 (0.01) −0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01)∗∗∗ −0.00 (0.02)
Migration 0.04 (0.10) −0.06 (0.04) −0.16 (0.14) −0.10 (0.05)∗ −0.14 (0.15)
Equipment −0.01 (0.05) 0.08 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.16 (0.12) 0.13 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.29 (0.13)∗∗
Area owned 0.00 (0.00) −0.01 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.02 (0.01)∗ 0.04 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.05 (0.01)∗∗∗
Distance to road −0.01 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.00 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.01 (0.00)∗∗
Extension 0.29 (0.83) 0.27 (0.06)∗∗∗ 0.36 (0.10)∗∗∗ 0.27 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.14 (0.11)
Groundnut AEZ −0.89 (0.15)∗∗∗ −0.24 (0.05)∗∗∗ −1.23 (0.17)∗∗∗ 0.00 (0.06) 0.03 (0.19)
Casamance AEZ −0.32 (0.12)∗∗∗ 0.36 (0.06)∗∗∗ −0.82 (0.17)∗∗∗ 0.12 (0.07)∗ −0.14 (0.18)
South-East AEZ −0.28 (0.12)∗∗ 0.35 (0.07)∗∗∗ −1.10 (0.19)∗∗∗ 0.24 (0.08)∗∗∗ −0.02 (0.20)
Information on Sales 0.80 (0.29)∗∗∗ 0.09 (0.16) 0.15 (0.23) 0.26 (0.19) 0.53 (0.25)∗∗
Tap water 0.20 (0.08)∗∗∗ −0.00 (0.04) 0.23 (0.12)∗ −0.02 (0.04) 0.16 (0.13)
Extension residuals 0.44 (0.44)
Adj. R2 0.10 0.29 0.15 0.25
Log Likelihood -1038.13
Num. obs. 4245 3873 372 3873 372
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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R = 0.26 , p = 2.7e-07
y = 2.4 + 3.9 x + 2.4 x2    Radj
















R = 0.11 , p = 0.032
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Figure 3: Heterogeneity over household head age
R = - 0.17 , p = 0.0011
y = 2.6 - 0.038 x    Radj
















R = - 0.038 , p = 0.47
y = 2 - 0.0075 x    Radj

















Figure 4: Heterogeneity over active family labour
29
R = - 0.062 , p = 0.23
y = 2.4 - 0.1 x    Radj
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Figure 5: Heterogeneity over agricultural equipment ownership
R = - 0.16 , p = 0.002
y = 2.5 - 0.02 x    Radj
















R = 0.31 , p = 1.2e-09
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Figure 6: Heterogeneity over land ownership
R = 0.21 , p = 6.3e-05
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R = - 0.24 , p = 2.8e-06
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Figure 7: Heterogeneity over access to road
30
